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An Introduction to Self-Incrimination in
Jewish Law, With Application to the
American Legal System: A Psychological
and Philosophical Analysis
SAMUEL J. LEVINE*

I. INTRODUCTION

Law serves a central role in Jewish faith and tradition. Indeed,
Jewish law comprises a legal system which developed over
thousands of years, exploring and regulating every form of human
endeavor and experience.' Thus, it may be unsurprising that
.Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; LL.M.,
Columbia
University; J.D., Fordham University; Ordination, Yeshiva University; B.A., Yeshiva
University.
This Essay expands on my contribution to a forthcoming book, VIEWING LAW
THROUGH THE EYES OF FAITH, edited by my colleague Bob Cochran, and consisting of
papers based on presentations delivered at the 2002 Conference of Religiously Affiliated
Law Schools that Bob organized at Pepperdine University School of Law. The Essay also
builds on my remarks at both the 2004 Conference of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools
that Jack Pratt organized at Notre Dame Law School and the program of the Section on
Law and Religion that Frank Ravitch organized at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools. I thank Bob, Jack, and Frank for inviting me to
participate at the respective conferences, I thank Rick Garnett and Tom Shaffer for
encouraging me further to develop these thoughts, and I thank Joshua Dressler for helpful
comments. I thank Emily Peacock, Pepperdine University School of Law, Class of 2005,
for research assistance. Finally, I thank Fraida Liba, Yehudah, Aryeh, and Rachel for their
continued encouragement.
1. See, e.g., ARYEH KAPLAN, THE HANDBOOK OF JEWISH THOUGHT 78 (1979)
(stating that the commandments "penetrate every nook and cranny of a person's
existence, hallowing even the lowliest acts and elevating them to a service to God" and
that "the multitude of laws governing even such mundane acts as eating, drinking, dressing
and business, sanctify every facet of life, and constantly remind one of [one's]
responsibilities toward God"). See also Moshe Silberg, Law and Morals in Jewish
Jurisprudence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 306, 322 (1961) ("The... mode of dress.... diet,
dwelling, behavior, relation with [others], .... family affairs, and.., business affairs were all
prefixed and premolded, in a national cloak, in a set of laws that was clear, severe, strict,
detailed, that accompanied [an individual] day by day, from cradle to grave."). See infra
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American courts and legal scholars have increasingly turned to
Jewish legal tradition for insights into various issues confronting
the American legal system.2 Jewish law has provided an alternative
model and, at times, a contrast case that some have found
particularly helpful in illuminating complex, controversial, and
unsettled areas of American law.3
In light of these developments, this Essay aims to consider the
efficacy of drawing on Jewish law to facilitate a more thoughtful
analysis of issues in American law, with a specific focus on the
issue of self-incrimination. The Essay begins with a brief
description of the function of Jewish law within Jewish faith and
tradition. Employing a psychological and philosophical
framework, the Essay then explores the issue of self-incrimination
in Jewish law, both on its own terms and through an analysis of its
potential relevance to difficult questions regarding the use of
criminal confessions in the United States.' The Essay concludes
notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Daniel G. Ashburn, Appealing to a Higher Authority?: Jewish Law in
American Judicial Opinions, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 295, 298-99, 301, 303, 307, 310-13
(1994); Chad Baruch & Karsten Lokken, Research of Jewish Law Issues: A Basic Guide
and Bibliography for Students and Practitioners,77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 303-304
(2000); Samuel J. Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American ConstitutionalTheory: Some
Comparisons and Contrasts, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441-42, 444 (1997) [hereinafter
Levine, Jewish Legal Theory]; Samuel J. Levine, Teaching Jewish Law in American Law
Schools-Part II: An Annotated Syllabus, 2 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2002);
Samuel J. Levine, Teaching Jewish Law in American Law Schools: An Emerging
Development in Law and Religion, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041, 1042 (1999); Suzanne
Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in
ContemporaryAmerican Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 814 (1993).
3. See supra note 2.
4. An examination of self-incrimination may be particularly instructive, as it involves
an area of law in which American courts and scholars alike have relied upon the Jewish
legal system to analyze and interpret American legal principles. A substantial body of
American case law and scholarship has referred to the Jewish law of self-incrimination.
The list of such cases includes: Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-8 n.5
(1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 n.27 (1966); In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298,
1300 (D. Nev. 1983); Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 870 (E.D. Mich. 1991); People v.
Brown, 86 Misc. 2d 339, 487 n.5 (Nassau County Ct. 1975); Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F.
Supp. 1505, 1517 n.20 (D. Colo. 1989); State v. McCloskey, 446 A.2d. 1201, 1208 n.4 (N.J.
1982); U.S. v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1425 (11th Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Huss, 482 F.2d. 38, 51
(2d Cir. 1973).
The list of scholarship includes: LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 433-441 (1968); Albert W.
Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, in
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 181,

279 n.28 (1997); Isaac Braz, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Anglo-American
Law: The Influence of Jewish Law, in JEWISH LAW AND CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS
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with the cautious proposition that the American law of selfincrimination may benefit from incorporating some of the insights
offered by Jewish legal thought.

161-168 (Nahum Rakover ed., 1984); Malvina Halberstam, The Rationale for Excluding
IncriminatingStatements: U.S. Law Compared to Ancient Jewish Law, in JEWISH LAW
AND CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra 4, at 177; George Horowitz, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination-How Did It Originate?, 31 TEMPLE L.Q. 121, 125 (1958);
Simcha Mandelbaum, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Anglo-American and
Jewish Law, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 115, 116-118 (1956); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L.
Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Talmudic Rule Against Self-Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 955, 955 (1988); Bernard Susser, Worthless Confessions: The Torah Approach, 130
NEW L.J. 1056 (1980); Cheryl G. Bader, "Forgive me Victim for I Have Sinned": Why
Repentance and the CriminalJustice System Do Not Mix-A Lesson From Jewish Law, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 69, 88 (2003); Suzanne Darrow-Kleinhaus, The Talmudic Rule
Against Self-Incrimination and the American Exclusionary Rule: A Societal Prohibition
Versus an Affirmative Individual Right, 21 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 205, 206-7
passim (2002); Michelle M. Sharoni, A Journey of Two Countries:A Comparative Study of
the Death Penalty in Israel and South Africa, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 257,
263 (2001); Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A
Game Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 431, 452
n.70 (2000); Erica Smith-Klocek, Note, A Halachic Perspective on the Parent-Child
Privilege, 39 CATH. LAW. 105, 109 (1999); Gregory Thomas Stremers, The SelfIncriminationClause and the Threat of Foreign Prosecutionin Bankruptcy Proceedings:A
Comment on Moses v. Allard, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 847, 854-55 (1993); Debra
Ciardiello, Seeking Refuge in the Fifth Amendment: The Applicability of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination to Individuals Who Risk Incrimination Outside the United
States, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 722, 725 (1992); Aaron M. Schreiber, The Jurisprudenceof
Dealing with Unsatisfactory Fundamental Law: A Comparative Glance at the Different
Approaches in Medieval Criminal Law, Jewish Law and the United States Supreme Court,
11 PACE L. REV. 535, 550 (1991).
Although in a number of cases and works the references to Jewish law are fairly brief
and tangential, others demonstrate the significance that has been accorded Jewish law in
consideration of the American rule of self-incrimination. For example, in Miranda v.
Arizona, the landmark United States Supreme Court case defining the contours of the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion
cited a reference to Jewish law. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, at 458, n.27 (1966). Moreover,
Leonard Levy closes his groundbreaking historical study of the origins of the privilege
with an Appendix entitled "Talmudic Law," stating that "[n]o description of the origins of
the right against self-incrimination would be complete without acknowledgment of the
existence of the right in ancient Jewish law." See LEVY, supra 4, at 433-41. Finally, in his
Introduction to Professor Aaron Kirschenbaum's exhaustive study of self-incrimination in
Jewish law, Arthur J. Goldberg, a former justice of the United States Supreme Court,
writes that "[w]e have something to learn from this ancient tradition, particularly now,
when our constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, embodied in the Fifth
Amendment, is under attack." Arthur J. Goldberg, Introduction, in AARON
KIRSCHENBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW viii-ix (1970).
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LOOK AT THE ROLE OF LAW IN JEWISH FAITH AND
TRADITION

It would seem difficult to overstate the importance of Jewish
law, or halacha, in Jewish faith and tradition. This is the case
particularly for those who appreciate the Torah as divinely
authored and immutable. Describing halacha as "central" or
"essential" does not capture the extent of the significance that
Jewish thought attaches to the letter and the spirit of the law. The
Torah and Midrashic exegesis dramatically depict the Revelation
at Sinai and the giving of the law as both the formative moment of
the Nation of Israel and the basis of the Nation's relationship with
God
Moreover, study of the law is viewed as a powerful means of
connecting with God on both intellectual and spiritual levels. As
the halacha is of divine origin, it serves as a primary source for
understanding God's will, God's ways, and God's wisdom.6 Indeed,
God's law provides a unique avenue for relating to the reality of
God's world.7 The Talmud states strikingly that, since the
5. See, e.g., ABRAHAM R. BESDIN, 1 REFLECTIONS OF THE RAy: LESSONS IN
JEWISH THOUGHT, ADAPTED FROM LECTURES OF RABBI JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK 8998 (2d Rev. ed. 1993); KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 53-58; ELIYAHU KITOV, 2 THE BOOK OF
OUR HERITAGE 265-69 (Nathan Bulman trans., 1978) (originally published in Hebrew as
SEFER HA-TODA'AH (1976)). See also RABBI AHARON LICHTENSTEIN, 2 LEAVES OF
FAITH: THE WORLD OF JEWISH LEARNING 227 (2004):
It was... at Sinai... that [the Nation of Israel] attained mature national
fruition; and it was there that two new related elements, henceforth cardinal
Jewish values, entered the picture. The first was Torah, the content of revelation
proper, whose study and perpetuation then became a central Jewish concern.
The second was Israel, a covenantal community forged by axiological
commitment no less than by historical destiny ....
6. See RABBI HERSHEL SCHACHTER, ERETZ HATZEVI: BE'UREI SUGYOT 1-2
(1992).
It may be instructive to quote at length the words of Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein:
[The study of the law offers] insight, as direct and profound as [a human] is
privileged to attain, into the revealed will of [the] Creator... an opportunity to
get (salve reverentia) a first-hand knowledge of the divine will, to deepen and
broaden our minute understanding of God's infinite reason. In its essence, the
Torah-particularly the Hala[c]ha-constitutes an immanent expression of
God's transcendent rational will. By studying its texts, analyzing its principles,
and developing its ideas, we are able to approach, however haltingly, that
unattainable goal toward which [Moses] strove so desperately... "Let me know
Thy ways."
AHARON LICHTENSTEIN, 1 LEAVES OF FAITH: THE WORLD OF JEWISH LEARNING 91
(2003) (quoting Exodus 33:13).
7. As Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik describes in extensive detail:
[T]he essence of the Hala[c]ha[], which was received from God, consists in
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destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem, God's "place" in the
world is found in the halacha and its application.! Thus, exploring

the law in pursuit of the divine comprises an inherently profound
and spiritually transforming experience.'
In addition to the cognitive and spiritual significance of the
law, as the Hebrew term implies, halacha offers a way of life-a
path for all of life's endeavors and activities.1" The substance of
creating an ideal world and recognizing the relationship between that ideal
world and our concrete environment in all its visible manifestations and
underlying structures. There is no phenomenon, entity or object in this concrete
world which the a priori Hala[c]ha[] does not approach with its ideal standard.
RABBI JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAKHIC MAN 19-20 (Lawrence Kaplan trans., 1983)
(originally published in Hebrew as ISH HA-HALAKHAH, in 1 Talpiot3-4 (1944)).
8. See THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Berakoth 8a. See also RABBI YITZCHAK
HUTNER, PACHAD YITZCHAK: CHANUKA 63-75 (1998).
9. Again, in the words of Rabbi Lichtenstein:
Torah study, when properly pursued, affects our total spiritual personality.
Partly because it does afford us a better insight into inscrutable divine wisdom,
and partly because it engages the mind-and with it the whole [person]-in
pursuit of religious knowledge, it transmutes our innermost being. The
knowledge we can acquire of God's will increases our conscious, and
subconscious, awareness of [God]; the very act of weighing [God's] words or of
analyzing [God's] laws draws us imperceptibly nearer to [God] and to them....
Torah study leaves an indelible imprint upon our total personality and, in the
process, transforms it .... Torah study becomes the premier agent in effecting a
gradual spiritual regeneration. Paradoxically, through a constant reciprocal
process, it both sustains piety and is sustained by it. Keener study leads to
greater piety, and more fervent devotion leads to profounder knowledge.
LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 6, at 91-92. Cf RABBI CHAIM OF VOLOZHIN, NEFESH
HACHAIM, Section 4; SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 7, at 87 ("The cognition of the Torahthis is the holiest and most exalted type of service. ... The study of the Torah is not a
means to another end, but is the end point of all desires. It is the most fundamental
principle of all.").
10. See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 341-42 (describing the "concept of normative
existence, of a life governed by divinely ordained law and organized as an all-embracing
religious discipline" and stating that through the Halacha a person's "whole life is
permeated by an awareness of [one's] relation to God"; that "[i]n every sphere of
endeavor-be it social or economic, physical or intellectual-conscious choice and
religious response are operative"; and that "the Halacha, through its numerous laws
concerning various areas, directs ... the sanctification of [self] and ...environment[ ,l
suffus[ing]... life with spiritual significance, and integrat[ing] ... activity into a divinely
ordered whole"). See also Samuel J. Levine, Halacha and Aggada: Translating Robert
Cover's Nomos and Narrative, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 465,484 (1998):
[T]he Hebrew term "halacha," though implying a legal order and often used to
denote "Jewish religious law," suggests a broader range of ideas than those
included in legal rules. A more literal translation of "halacha" would evoke a
"path" of life; to inhabit the halacha is, by definition, to live in it. Thus, the
halacha truly provides a "world-view" through which all of the world and life's
experiences are perceived. Moreover, as a path of life, halacha incorporates
those aspects of normative life that complement the legal precepts, the aggada.
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halacha extends far beyond the "rituals" of Jewish "religious"
practice. In the words of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, a leading
contemporary scholar of Jewish law, "[t]here is no phenomenon,
entity, or object in this concrete world" beyond the grasp of
halacha." For example, he notes, "just a few of the multitude of
hala[c]hic subjects" include: "sociological creations: the state,
society, and the relationship of individuals within a communal
context"; "laws of business, torts, neighbors, plaintiff and
defendant, creditor and debtor, partners, agents, workers, artisans,
bailees"; "[f]amily life"; "[w]ar, the high court, courts and penalties
they impose"; and "psychological problems."12 Thus, the
foundational and authoritative texts of Jewish law-from the
Torah and the Talmud to commentaries, codifications and
responsa-contain prescriptions for ethical conduct and moral
behavior in public and private, and in both worship and more
worldly activities.13
Moreover, lending even further depth to halacha, the law has
developed over the course of thousands of years in numerous and
disparate societal and geographical settings, under both benign
and, all-too-often, belligerent and oppressive circumstances.
Consequently, the law continuously confronted countless varieties
of previously unaddressed issues demanding consideration and
normative resolution." Through a careful combination of fidelity
to the past and, when necessary, innovation and creativity, legal

11. SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 7, at 20.
12. Id. at 22. See also Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously: Broad Ethics
Provisions and Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in a Comparative Hermeneutic

Framework,77 TULANE L. REV. 527, 542-43 n.56 (2003) (citing sources for the proposition
that "[s]cholars of Jewish law identify 613 commandments enumerated in the Torah,
covering nearly every area of human activity"; that "[i]n addition, many of these
commandments can further be divided into component parts, resulting in a substantially
larger number of enumerated obligations"; and that "there exist other imperatives that,
although for methodological reasons are not tallied as commandments, nonetheless
present yet additional enumerated obligations").
13. See Samuel J. Levine, Reflections on the Practice of Law as a Religious Calling,
From a Perspective of Jewish Law and Ethics, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 411, 412 (2005); Samuel J.

Levine, The Broad Life of the Jewish Lawyer: Integrating Spirituality, Scholarship, and
Profession, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1199, 1199 (1996).

14. See, e.g., Michael Broyde & Howard Jachter, Electrically Produced Fire or Light
in Positive Commandments, 25 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC'Y 89, 125-6 (1993); Michael

Broyde & Howard Jachter, The Use of Electricity on Shabbat and Yom Toy, 21 J.
HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC'Y 4 (1991); Arthur Schaffer, The History of Horseradishas a
Bitter Herb on Passover, 8 GESHER 217 (1981); ADIN STEINSALTZ, THE ESSENTIAL
TALMUD 234-38 (Chaya Galai trans., 1976).
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authorities have responded to these challenges by applying settled
and known legal principles to resolve the questions accompanying
new and unanticipated circumstances. 5
Acknowledging the range and depth of the Jewish legal
system, contemporary American courts and scholars have turned
to Jewish law for insights into numerous substantive and
theoretical issues. American judicial opinions and law review
articles have relied upon substantive parallels in the two legal
systems in areas such as criminal law and procedure, family law,
torts, property, evidence, ethics, commercial law, and health law.16
Somewhat more ambitiously and perhaps even more effectively,
some scholars have looked at the conceptual underpinnings of
various aspects of Jewish law and Jewish legal theory to illuminate
not only substantive issues in American law but also some of the
more complex and theoretical issues prevalent in American legal
scholarship. 7 Of course, the two legal systems are premised upon
fundamentally different assumptions: one based self-consciously
on religion and the other requiring a more generally accessible
rationale for legal decisions. Thus, Jewish law and American law
sometimes produce radically different responses to similar legal
questions. Nevertheless, the two systems share significant
conceptual similarities, which allows careful and productive
analytical comparison.
To illustrate the possible application of halacha in the analysis
of the American legal system, it may be instructive to examine a
specific issue of significance in American law through the lens of
Jewish law. American courts and scholars face important
15. See RABBI HERSHEL SCHACHTER, B'IKVEI HATZOAN 1-3 (1997). See also

Levine, Jewish Legal Theory, supra note 2, at 453-57; Samuel J. Levine, An Introductionto
Legislation in Jewish Law, with References to the American Legal System, 29 SETON HALL
L. REV. 916, 932-35 (1998) (discussing modification of Rabbinic legislation as a result of

changed circumstances).
16. See supranote 2.
17. See id.

18. For differing views on the efficacy of such comparative analysis, compare Samuel
J. Levine, Capital Punishment in Jewish Law and Its Application to the American Legal
System: A Conceptual Overview, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1037, 1037-38 n.2 (1998) (citing, as
examples of scholarship endorsing such application, David R. Dow, Constitutional
Midrash: The Rabbis' Solution to Professor Bickel's Problem, 29 HOuS. L. REV. 543, 544
(1992); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Guilt: Henry Friendly Meets the
Maharal of Prague, 90 MICH. L. REV. 604, 614-15 (1991)), with Levine, supra at 1038 n.3

(citing, as examples of scholarship expressing a more cautious approach, Steven F.
Friedell, Book Review: Aaron Kirschenbaum on Equity in Jewish Law, 1993 BYU L. REV.
909, 919 (1993); Stone, supra note 2, at 893-94). See also infra note 64.
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challenges with the issue of self-incrimination, while the Jewish
legal system has addressed the issue since ancient times. In fact, it
is not uncommon for both American courts and American legal
scholars to refer to and rely on the treatment of self-incrimination
in Jewish law. Therefore, a discussion about self-incrimination
may serve as a particularly helpful model for a broader
understanding of the role of law in Jewish faith and tradition as
well as a consideration of conceptual comparisons between the
Jewish legal system and the American legal system.
III.SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW: A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

The rule concerning self-incrimination in Jewish law may be
summarized quite succinctly: an individual may not be punished on
the basis of self-incriminatory statements." Although the precise
nature of the rule has been the subject of detailed discussion and
debate from Talmudic times to the present,21 there is universal
agreement among sources and authorities in Jewish law accepting
a general rule precluding punitive confessions." Moreover, as this
rule is not subject to dispute, its categorical application operates
independent of attempts to ascribe or ascertain a divine rationale
for the rule.23Indeed, as Jewish law is understood to reflect God's
divine will and wisdom, it is not uncommon for legal authorities
and philosophers of Jewish law to consider the law on two
different planes. On a practical level, for halacha to function, a
systematic application of the law requires derivation and
19. See sources cited supra note 4.
20. See, e.g., THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 9b; MAIMONIDES, Laws of

Sanhedrin 18:6, in MISHNE TORAH (Abraham M. Hershman trans., Yale Univ. Press
1949). See also MAIMONIDES, Laws of Eduth 12:2, in MISHNE TORAH, supra.

21. For works in English analyzing Talmudic and post-Talmudic sources addressing
the issue of self-incrimination, see KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 4, at 34-92; Arnold Enker,
Self-Incrimination in Jewish Law-A Review Essay, 4 DINt ISRAEL cvii (1973) (reviewing
KIRSCHENBAUM, supra); Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 984-1041.
22. Professor Kirschenbaum has identified Rabbi Solomon ben Simeon Duran
[Rashbash], an Algerian fifteenth century rabbi, as "to the best of my knowledge, the only
Jewish authority who disagrees with the general interpretation of the rabbinic law against
criminal confessions." KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 4, at 68. After carefully analyzing the
position set forth by Rashbash, Kirschenbaum responds dismissively, concluding that
Rashbash "is not only alone in his opinion on self-incrimination. His proof-texts are not
convincing, and the weight of the traditional evidence is in direct opposition to him. No
later authority takes up his position, and no later decision follows his line of reasoning."
Id. at 72.
23. See MAIMONIDES, Laws of Sanhedrin 18:6, in MISHNE TORAH, supra note 20.
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delineation of the substance of the law and its interpretation under
various circumstances and conditions. Though neither superficial
nor overly formalistic, this level of understanding often addresses
primarily the mechanics of the law, without necessitating an
investigation into the divine rationale behind the law. As some
have put
it, this enterprise emphasizes the "what" rather than the
"why.""4 In the area of ritual law in particular, legal interpretation
and application, though often complex, generally depend upon
defining the law and its parameters rather than on attempting to
identify the divine wisdom reflected in the ritual commandment.25
Likewise, legal authorities interpret and apply the substance of the
rule against self-incrimination largely independent of any
reasoning that may be offered as a logical basis for the rule.26
On a more theoretical level, however, philosophers of Jewish
law often look beyond the mechanics of the law and attempt to
glean the divine wisdom present in legal rules.27 Indeed,
Maimonides, one of the most influential Medieval legal authorities
and philosophers, dedicates a substantial portion of Moreh
Hanevuchim, his philosophical magnum opus, to uncovering divine
reasoning for ostensibly arational Biblical laws.28 Such an endeavor
24. See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 6, at 194. See also ABRAHAM R. BESDIN, 2
REFLECTIONS OF THE RAV: MAN OF FAITH IN THE MODERN WORLD, ADAPTED FROM
LECTURES OF RABBI JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK 91-99 (1989); JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK,
THE HALAKHIC MIND: AN ESSAY ON JEWISH TRADITION AND MODERN THOUGHT 94
(1986).
25. See Levine, Jewish Legal Theory, supra note 2, at 458-61; SCHACHTER, supra note
6, at 135.
26. Cf. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1027 n.256 (stating that "[alt the risk
of oversimplification, the traditional view is that Jewish law embodies an absolute
prohibition against the use of confessions in criminal and quasi-criminal cases because
God has so decreed" but adding that "... [flaith does not, however, preclude intellectual
grappling with such issues").
27. See BESDIN, supra note 24, at 91-92 ("[O]ne may distinguish between motivations,
explanations, and interpretations. Ascribing Divine motivations is a hopeless exercise;
explaining how the ritual achieves its purpose is a futile enterprise. But offering a
subjective interpretation which will strengthen its spiritual meaning for the worshipper is
not only permissible, but should even be encouraged."); see also id. at 98 ("Accepting
[commandments] ...with pious obedience is meritorious, but ascribing an interpretive
meaning, heightens the spiritual experience.., engaging us both intellectually and
emotionally in the worship of God").
See also BESDIN, supra note 5, at 91-99; YITZCHAK HEINEMANN, TA'AMEI HAMITZVOT BESAFRUT YISRAEL (1954); DAVID NOVAK, NATURAL LAW IN JUDAISM 6291 (1998); SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 24, at 91-99. See generally Samuel J. Levine, Ours to
Reason Why: The Quest for Ta'ameiHaMitzvot, HAMEVASER 7 (May 1990).
28. See MAIMONIDES, MOREH HANEVUCHIM [GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED], Section
3 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1963); SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 24, at 91-92 (declaring that

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 28:257

requires not only a healthy dose of ambition, sufficient to motivate
pursuit of the divine rationale behind the law, but also an
appropriate measure of humility, allowing for the acknowledgment
that ultimately, God's reasoning remains unknowable to humans.29
In the context of the rule against self-incrimination, attempts to
identify a divine rationale have produced a variety of penetrating
insights into the law."
In the Mishne Torah, Maimonides' monumental codification
of the entire corpus of Jewish law, the discussion of selfincrimination is comprised of a two-tiered analysis. 1 Maimonides
first introduces the rule against self-incrimination as a "scriptural
decree.'32 In an apparent reference to Biblical verses,3 he writes
that capital or corporal punishment may be implemented based
only upon the testimony of two witnesses.34 Although divine
decree is, by definition, binding and authoritative without need for
further justification, Maimonides nevertheless suggests a rationale
for the law. According to Maimonides, confessions may not serve
"[one of the most perplexing problems" in Jewish philosophy "is that of the
rationalization for the commandments" and observing that "[t]wenty-five chapters of the
Guide [for the Perplexed] are devoted exclusively to the solution of this problem"). See
also BESDIN, supra note 24, at 101 (citing the writings of Maimonides in the Mishne Torah
in support of the proposition that "even as we perform rituals in accordance with God's
will, whose reasons are inscrutable, we may ascribe interpretations in order to give
meaning to our spiritual experience").
29. "The attempt to discover a rationale for [commandments] is generally considered
a noble pursuit. For example, Maimonides writes that it is proper to contemplate the
[commandments] and if possible to suggest reasons for them." Levine, Jewish Legal
Theory, supra note 2, at 459 n.104 (quoting MAIMONIDES, supra note 20, Laws of
Temurah 4:13). "Nevertheless, Maimonides stresses that if an individual is unable to
discover a rationale for a particular [commandment], he or she should recognize that there
is still a Divine rationale for it." Id. (quoting MAIMONIDES, supra note 20, Laws of
Me'ilah 8:8).
30. See Haim H. Cohn, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Israel, 51 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 175, 177-78 (1960); Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 4,
at 1027-41.
31. For works in English discussing the analysis presented by Maimonides, see
KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 4, at 62-68, and Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at
1032-41.
32. See MAIMONIDES, supra note 20, Laws of Sanhedrin 18:6. For a discussion of the
implications of the term "scriptural decree" in this context, see Rosenberg & Rosenberg,
supranote 4, at 1033-34 n.284.
33. See, e.g., Numbers 35:30; Deuteronomy 17:6; Deuteronomy 19:15. For works in
English analyzing Biblical sources for the prohibition against self-incrimination, see
KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 4, at 25-33, and Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at
974-84.
34. See MAIMONIDES, supra note 20, Laws of Sanhedrin 18:6.
35. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
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as the basis for punishment because of a concern that perhaps the
defendant confessed out of a "confused mind" in the matter.
Maimonides describes a form of extreme depression that results in
suicidal tendencies; he explains that an individual suffering from
such a condition may falsely confess to a capital offense for the
purpose of being executed. 7 Maimonides then concludes his

discussion of the subject with a reminder that, regardless of any
rationale identified and articulated by humans, the exclusion of
self-incrimination remains a divine decree.
Throughout his many works of law and philosophy,
Maimonides developed groundbreaking frameworks for the
analysis of nearly every area of Jewish thought. 9 His discussion of
has provided fertile ground for later
self-incrimination
commentators, perhaps most significant among them Rabbi David
ben Zimra [Radbaz], who lived several centuries after Maimonides
and authored an important commentary on the Mishne Torah.'
Like Maimonides, Radbaz states that the rule against selfincrimination is a divine decree; therefore, its inherent wisdom is

36. See MAIMONIDES, supra note 20, Laws of Sanhedrin 18:6.
37. See id. A number of scholars of Jewish law have offered alternative psychological
explanations for the ban on self-incrimination, identifying ulterior motives that may
induce a false confession. Professor Kirschenbaum has cited the following suggestions:
[An individual] may have been present at certain business transactions or ritual
ceremonies, and now, summoned to testify..."confesses" to a sin which
disqualifies [the individual from testifying as a witness] and thereby "escapes." A
confession to having committed a minor violation may furnish.., an alibi for a
major crime ... perpetrated. Ulterior motives may vary: from a desire to save a
beloved friend from punishment to an attempt to obtain warm shelter and food
in winter-the possibilities are limitless.
KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 4, at 64-65.
38. See MAIMONIDES, supra note 20, Laws of Sanhedrin18:6.
39. See

ISADORE TWERSKY, INTRODUCTION

TO THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES

(MISHNEH TORAH) 1 (1980). Professor Twersky observed that
[Maimonides'] reputation needs no inflation or exaggeration, for his stature is
nearly sui generis and his commanding influence has been almost universally
recognized.... He wrote epoch-making works in the central areas of halaka and
religious philosophy-an achievement that is unquestionably, almost
overpoweringly, characterized by monumentality, using the term very literally.
His works, representing an unprecedented conjunction of halakic authority and
philosophic prestige, were extensively studied, meticulously annotated,
frequently translated, and intensively interpreted. Their influence, direct as well
as indirect, reflected through many works in various genres by a host of authors,
was global.
40. For works in English analyzing the position of Radbaz, see KIRSCHENBAUM,
supra note 4, at 72-77, and Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1036-41.
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beyond question.41 Nevertheless, again like Maimonides, Radbaz
engages in an attempt to understand the divine logic underlying
the rule.4
Expounding upon, or perhaps adding to, the rationale that
Maimonides proposes, Radbaz emphasizes a distinction between
confessions: those that potentially result in capital or corporal
punishment, which are excluded from evidence, and concessions to
monetary obligation, which are admissible as evidence and bind
the defendant to satisfy the obligation. 3 Radbaz explains that in
Jewish thought, human beings have legal authority over their
physical possessions, including both the autonomy to give their
possessions to others and, consequently, the authority to admit to
and thereby obligate themselves in a monetary debt." In contrast,
Jewish thought views both human life and the human body as
sacred, to the extent that humans do not have legal autonomy to
commit suicide or even harm their own bodies. 5 Therefore,
because human life remains within God's province, human beings
may not offer a legally valid confession resulting in their lives
being taken, or in another form of corporal or capital
punishment.'
As divine law is deemed eternally and universally binding on
all segments of the Jewish nation, in any time or place, it is not
uncommon for legal philosophers to seek philosophical or
psychological lessons in the law which are particularly suitable to
the societal context in which they live. Thus, for example, Rabbi
Norman Lamm, later president of Yeshiva University, authored an
influential 1956 article providing a decidedly modern

41. See Radbaz, Commentary, in MAIMONIDES, MISHNE TORAH, Laws of Sandedrin

18:6, supra note 20.
42. See id. See also supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
43. See Radbaz, supra note 41.
44. See id.
45. See id. (quoting Ezekiel 18:4).
46. See id. Other scholars have offered alternative explanations for the different rules
regarding criminal confessions and monetary admissions. "[By an admission, an
obligation was created which had only to be enforced by the court; whereas the conviction
of a criminal offence was not in the nature of the enforcement by the court of an
obligation voluntarily undertaken by a party but of a creation by the court of the party's
liability. Cohn, supra note 30, at 178 (quoting MORDECHAi EPSTEIN, LEVUSH
MORDECHAI (19th Century). For further discussion of the differences in the nature of
criminal and monetary obligation, see KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 4, at 78-81;
SCHACHTER, supra note 15, at 266-68; SCHACHTER, supra note 6, at 276.
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understanding of the theories of Maimonides and Radbaz.47
Observing that Maimonides premised his analysis on psychological
considerations of suicidal tendencies, Rabbi Lamm asserts that
Maimonides "anticipated by some seven hundred years, albeit in
rudimentary fashion, a major achievement of psychoanalysis[,]"
namely, Freud's theory of "Death Wish" or "Death Instinct."4 In
Freud's view, Rabbi Lamm explains, at a basic level the Death
Wish "reveals itself generally as destructiveness, in its many varied
forms, and, in extreme cases, in homicide." 9 However, "because of
a variety of reasons, the Death Wish, originally felt toward others,
is usually frustrated and as a result is redirected toward the self."5
Finally, "[a]t times, therefore, this Death Wish when it reaches its
ultimate expression and is redirected towards the self, appears as
suicide."5"
Moreover, Rabbi Lamm finds a further analogue to modern
psychoanalytical theory in the exclusion of self-incrimination in
Jewish law in cases involving forms of corporal punishment other
than capital punishment. Turning to the work of Karl Menninger,
Rabbi Lamm notes that because the Death Instinct is usually only
partially neutralized by the Life Instinct, the emerging tension
produces not suicide, but "a variety of forms of partial or chronic
self-destruction," including "self-injury and self-mutilation."52
Thus, Rabbi Lamm concludes, "[w]hile certainly not all, or even
most criminal confessions are directly attributable, in whole or in
part, to the Death Instinct, the Hala[c]ha is sufficiently concerned
with the minority of instances, where such is the case, to disqualify
all criminal confessions and to discard confession as a legal
instrument."53
IV.APPLICATION TO THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM

In light of the foregoing overview of the nature of halacha in
47. Norman Lamm, The Fifth Amendment and Its Equivalent in the Halakhah, 5
JUDAISM 53, 56 (1956).
48. Id. (citing SIGMUND FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON
PSYCHOANALYSIS 147 (W. W. Norton & Co. 1965); SIGMUND FREUD, BEYOND THE
PLEASURE PRINCIPLE (W. W. Norton & Co. 1961); Sigmund Freud, Mourning and

Melancholia,in IV COLLECTED PAPERS 156 (Hogarth Press, London 1925).
49. Id.
50. Id.

51. Id.
52. Id. at 57 (citing KARL MENNINGER, MAN AGAINST HIMSELF 82 (1938)).
53. Id. at 59.
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general and the rule in Jewish law regarding self-incrimination in
particular, it may be instructive to consider possible application to
the American legal system. One perspective for analyzing this
question might operate from within Jewish legal theory, accepting
the inherent authority of Jewish law to prescribe rules for the
proper administration of justice in contemporary American
society. An attempt to resolve this question thereby involves the
broader issue of the Noachide laws, which, under Jewish thought,
comprise a legal system applicable to all of humanity.'
Although the overwhelming majority of material comprising
the corpus of Jewish law addresses the legal obligations of the
Jewish nation, the substance of the Noachide laws has occupied a
prominent position in Jewish legal discussion from ancient times
through the present.55 These discussions have resulted in a fairly
extensive body of law detailing various rules and regulations
governing a parallel legal system that differs in significant respects
from the legal system applicable to the Jewish nation. Not
surprisingly, however, as it remained largely academic throughout
most of Jewish history, the legal literature dealing with Noachide
law is not nearly as developed or comprehensive as that relating to
the law that was actually practiced amongst the Jewish nation. In
fact, in contrast to lengthy and wide-ranging considerations of the
issue of self-incrimination within the Jewish legal system, the
voluminous library of Jewish legal theory is largely bereft of
discussions of the admissibility of confessions under Noachide law.
The most prominent source to present a decisive position on
54. Under Jewish legal theory, God commanded all of humanity, through Adam, to
observe a universal legal system comprised of six basic laws. See KAPLAN, supra note 1, at
40. A seventh law was commanded to all of humanity through Noah, accounting for the
appellation of the Noachide laws. See id. God then began to command additional laws, to
Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and their descendants, culminating in the Revelation at Mount
Sinai, at which the Nation of Israel received, through Moses, all of the commandments
that constitute the Jewish legal system. See id. at 45-62.
55. See, e.g., THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 56a-59b; MAIMONIDES, supra
note 20, Laws of Kings, ch. 9-10; RABBI ZvI HIRSCH CHAJES, 1 KOL SIFREI MAHARITZ
CHAYOS (Collected Works) 58-63 (1958) (Hebrew); YITZCHAK HUTNER, PACHAD
YITZCHAK: SHAVUOTH 31-34 (1999). Moreover, a number of contemporary law
professors have produced English works dedicated to discussions of Noachide law. See,
e.g, J. DAVID BLEICH, Capital Punishment in the Noachide Code, in 2 CONTEMPORARY
HALAKHIC PROBLEMS 341-67 (1983); Arnold N. Enker, Aspects of Interaction Between
the Torah Law, the King's Law, and the Noahide Law in Jewish Criminal Law, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1137 (1991); Nahum Rakover, Jewish Law and the Noahide Obligation
to Preserve Social Order, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1073 (1991); Suzanne L. Stone, Sinaitic
and Noahide Law: Legal Pluralism in Jewish Law, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1157 (1991).
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this issue appears to be the Medieval work, Sefer Ha-Chinuch,
which declares that Noachide law does not preclude the use of
confessions as a basis for criminal punishment. In the absence of a
more definitive legal authority, however, a number of scholars
have attempted to draw inferences from a variety of legal sources. 7
Other scholars have relied on an analysis of the relevant legal
considerations. For example, some discussions have centered on
placing confessions in the context of the distinct rules of evidence
that govern the Noachide legal system.58 At least one scholar has
proposed, through a rather complex line of reasoning, alternative
resolutions of the issue corresponding to the differing rationales
offered by Maimonides and Radbaz59 for the ban on selfincrimination in proceedings operating under the Jewish legal
system.' Perhaps ironically, according to this logic, although the
various explanations offered for the preclusion of confessions in
Jewish law seem to have little, if any, effect on the application of
the rule in the Jewish legal system,61 they would have significant
practical ramifications for determination of the Noachide law of
criminal procedure. 2 Ultimately, however, discussions of the issue
of self-incrimination in Noachide law remain largely inconclusive.63
A different mode of analysis for considering the application
of the Jewish law of self-incrimination to the American legal
system might address the issue from within the perspective of
American law. Under such an approach, it would seem the

56. See SEFER HA-CHINUCH 81, 273 (Chaim Dov Chavel ed., 1986). For an analysis
of this position, see KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 4, at 97-98. For a discussion of the
authorship of the Sefer Ha-Chinuch, see CHAIM DOV CHAVEL, Editor's Introduction, in
SEFER HA-CHINUCH, supra, at 5-7.
57. See BLEICH, supra note 55, at 347-48 & nn.6-7 (citing efforts to draw inferences
from such authoritative sources as the Biblical Book of Samuel and the Jerusalem
Talmud); KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 4, at 96-99 & 179 nn.8-16.
58. See KIRSCHENBAUM, supranote 4, at 97-98, 179 nn.13-15.
59. See supra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
60. See YECHIEL YA'AKOV WEINBERG, 2 SERIDEI ESH 252 (1962), cited in BLEICH,
supra note 55, at 348 n.6.
61. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
62. Professor Kirschenbaum has suggested that the alternative explanations of
Maimonides and Radbaz may have practical legal ramifications in the Jewish legal system
as well, in relation to the issue of disqualification of witnesses. See KIRSCHENBAUM, supra
note 4, at 75-77. However, as Kirschenbaum emphasizes, according to either explanation,
"under no circumstances can [one] be punished, capitally or corporally, on the basis of
[one's] own statements." Id. at 77.
63. See BLEICH, supra note 55, at 348 (describing "conflicting views with regard to the
acceptance of a confession by Noachide courts").
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substance and reasoning of Jewish law is relevant only to the
extent that it is meaningful within the internal logic of American
legal discourse. Consequently, this analysis would discount any
suggestion that the American legal system should directly adopt
the rule of self-incrimination found in the Jewish legal system, or
any notion of the authority of Jewish law to prescribe binding rules
of evidence for the American legal system. Instead, a conceptual
approach to the application of Jewish law might motivate the
rethinking and possible modification of the American law of
confessions based on insights and lessons that arise out of an
analysis of the Jewish law regarding self-incrimination. '
Significantly, numerous courts and scholars alike have turned
to Jewish law to help inform the American law of selfincrimination, without advocating that the American legal system
incorporate an outright ban on criminal confessions." Writing for

64. A conceptual approach to the role of Jewish law as a form of comparative law for
the analysis of American law is consistent with the approach I have advocated elsewhere.
See Samuel J. Levine, Capital Punishment and Religious Arguments: An Intermediate
Approach, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 179, 190 (2000) (describing "the possibility and
utility of looking to religious thought, not as binding legal authority, but as a comparative
law model deserving attention in the consideration of American legal issues"); Samuel J.
Levine, Capital Punishment in Jewish Law and Its Application to the American Legal
System: A Conceptual Overview, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1037, 1039 (1998) (focusing on "the
conceptual underpinnings behind pertinent Jewish law, considering the potential relevance
and effect of those conceptualizations on American legal thought"); Samuel J. Levine,
Law, Ethics, and Religion in the Public Square: Principles of Restraint and Withdrawal, 83
MARQ. L. REV. 773, 780 (2000) (calling for "a consideration of the conceptual foundations
underlying the approach [to a legal issue] in Jewish law, with the aim of identifying and
applying those that are suitable to the American legal [system]"); Levine, Jewish Legal
Theory, supra note 2, at 444 (stating that "conceptual similarities between American law
and Jewish law allow for meaningful yet cautious comparison of the two systems").
See also Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1041-42:
Comparative law is tricky. The danger (or absurdity) of trying to stuff a whale
into a molted snakeskin is obvious. There is nonetheless an irresistible
temptation to try to derive at least some insights form a legal system two
thousand years old, that was quite advanced and sophisticated not only for its
time, but for ours, and that some claim to be the source of the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment.
Both cultures faced head on the question of the appropriate stance for
government with respect to inculpatory statements in criminal cases. On the
surface, the United States and ancient Israel appear to have made dissimilar
choices. Yet the two approaches are not unrelated, and their touch points can
perhaps assist in analysis of contemporary law (internal citations omitted).
Cf. Randy Lee, A Look at God, Feminism, and Tort Law, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 369
(1992); Steven D. Smith, Legal Discourse and the De Facto Disestablishment,81 MARQ. L.
REV. 203 (1998).
65. See sources cited supra note 4.
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the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona,66 the
landmark case defining the contours of the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination, Chief Justice Warren quoted the view of
Maimonides and referred to Rabbi Lamm's article. 67 Less than one
year later, addressing the concern of coercion in the context of
self-incrimination, Justice Douglas included in the Court's
majority opinion an extensive quotation from Rabbi Lamm's
article.' Likewise, a number of other courts, as well as scholars,
have found in the Jewish legal system an illuminating antecedent
for English and American laws providing protections against selfincrimination.69 Although some have questioned the existence of
any direct historical connection between Jewish law and American
law in this area,7 such objections should not preclude careful yet
valuable conceptual comparison.
In fact, application of the reasoning behind categorical
exclusion of criminal confessions in Jewish law does not imply
mechanical imposition of a similar ban in American law." As many
66. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
67. Id. at 458 & n.27 (citing MAIMONIDES, supra note 20, Laws of Sanhedrin 18:6;
Lamm, supra note 47). Chief Justice Warren observed that the "roots [of the privilege
against self-incrimination] go back into ancient times," and, quoting Maimonides, stated
that "[t]hirteenth century commentators found an analogue to the privilege grounded in
the Bible." Id.
68. See Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 n.5 (1967) (quoting Lamm,
supra note 47).
69. See supranote 4.
70. See, e.g., Arnold Enker, Self-Incrimination, in JEWISH LAW AND CURRENT
LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 4, at 169 (stating that "[t]he thesis of my presentation
today will be that exaggerated claims have been and are being made for the sources of
self-incrimination in Jewish law, and for the notion that important lessons can be learned
from Jewish law with respect to self-incrimination"); KIRSCHENBAUM, supranote 4, at 1921; LEVY, supra note 4, at 439-40 (stating that "[w]hether the existence of the right against
self-incrimination in Talmudic law in any way influenced the rise of the right in AngloAmerican law is an intriguing question" but concluding that "the answer, if based on
evidence rather than speculation, must be negative"). But see Braz, supra note 4, at 162
(arguing that "Jewish law and Talmudic jurisprudence constitute one of the main streams
that converged to form the unique common law doctrine against self-incrimination);
Horowitz, supranote 4. See also Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1042 n.310.
71. Moreover, although the ban on self-incrimination represents the normative
standard prescribed by the Jewish legal system, in practice the system provided a license
for deviation from this standard under exigent circumstances. See Enker, supra note 21, at
cxxiii; Enker, supra note 69, at 1141-1147; HALBERSTAM, supra note 4, at 187;
KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 4, at 82-92, 135-36; Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at
1018-27. These deviations would seemingly have to be acknowledged and addressed in any
attempts to incorporate mechanically into American law the precise rule of selfincrimination found in Jewish law. Indeed, at least one scholar finds the existence of such
deviations so significant as to preclude contemporary American relevance of the Jewish

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 28:257

scholars have noted, an outright preclusion of self-incrimination
would appear highly impractical in contemporary American
society, as well as contrary to the internal logic and experience of
the American legal system. 7 2 Nevertheless, a thoughtful
consideration of self-incrimination in Jewish law may lead to
rethinking the treatment of confessions in American law to include
a more subtle and nuanced definition and application of the basic
concept of voluntariness. In light of the seemingly perennial
problem of wrongfully obtained and even false confessions in the
United States,73 it may be wise to incorporate some of the
philosophical and psychological insights that scholars of Jewish law
have offered into the nature of and possible motivations behind an
admission of criminal conduct.
law of self-incrimination. See Enker, supra note 21, at cxxiii. Nevertheless, the conceptual
approach to the application of Jewish law to American law appears largely immune to
such objections, as the analysis relies not upon the practical implementation of the rule in
Jewish law but instead upon its conceptual articulation and its theoretical and
philosophical underpinnings.
72. See, e.g., Enker, supra note 21, at cxxii (concluding that "the Jewish Law treating
confessions is not particularly relevant to the [contemporary] confessions debate,
primarily because the procedural and evidentiary premises of the Jewish legal system
which developed these rules are so radically different from our own that the legal issues
posed are equally different"); KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 4, at 134-37 (stating that, for
the rules of self-incrimination in Jewish law to "be used intelligently" in contemporary
consideration of the issue, "certain factors must be mentioned and dealt with," including:
"whether the fact that the Jewish ancients lived a rather uncomplicated life in smaller,
relatively homogeneous groupings-both geographically and sociologically-allowed for
features in their judicial system that may strike us as starry-eyed and impractical"; and
"that the Rabbis believed sincerely that [humans] could not and [were] not commanded to
solve all problems of law-enforcement" as "Divine Justice and Divine Retribution were
realities in the world-view of the Rabbis," and thus "the liberal judicial procedure and
heavy protection of the rights of the accused in Jewish law were coupled with a deep
religious confidence that the criminal will eventually receive ...just deserts and that
justice will triumph"); Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1042-46.
73. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in
the Post-DNA World, 82 N. C. L. REV. 891, 901-07 (2004) (citing Hugo Adam Bedau &
Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriagesof Justice in Potentially CapitalCases, 40 STAN. L. REV.
21, 47, 49, 57 (1987); EDWARD CONNOR ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED
BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE
AFTER
TRIAL
15-17
(1996);
Innocence
Project,
Case
Profiles,
at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/index.php; BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD &
JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000)).
74. In fact, on the basis of an examination of Jewish law, a number of American legal

scholars have proposed and justified modifications to the American law of selfincrimination. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 4, at viii-ix (describing ways in which "[w]e
have something to learn from this ancient tradition"); HALBERSTAM, supra note 4, at 18687 (suggesting that "perhaps, as the [American] privilege [against self-incrimination]
approaches the absolute ... [i]t must be justified, if at all, only morally, as in ancient
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Indeed, a leading contemporary study of false confessions in
the American legal system describes two substantial factors
contributing to the phenomenon of "interrogation-induced false
confession." 5 The study identifies the primary factor as a complex
process of "psychological manipulation" and "psychological
coercion. '"' Additionally, according to the study, "some
individuals-particularly juveniles and the mentally retarded-are

Jewish law".); Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1042-46:
The rock bottom teaching of the Talmud is that a unitary, per se exclusionary
rule with respect to confessions is the preferred way to deal with this issue. In
this country, we have no single, absolute rule; instead, various provision give
piecemeal protection ....
... Miranda's method is more tenuous because the very people responsible for
obtaining evidence of crimes are also made responsible for assuring
voluntariness. When judicial inroads and excisions are added to that inherent
systemic weakness-inroads and excisions that tend to make the means as
relative as the ultimate standard-there is a corresponding increase in the
possibility of abusive police methods. The danger of a relative rule with respect
to confessions is that one's starting point is already at, or near, the cusp, and any
relaxation enhances the risk that resulting confessions will fall into the realm of
involuntariness and perhaps unreliability.
Miranda is the bright line in American law, our functional equivalent of the
Talmudic no-confessions rule.... Miranda's irrebuttable presumption was an
attempt to confine the vagaries of relativity, and every modification of it
resonates ominously. The more Miranda is devitalized, the greater and more
reasonable the doubts as to voluntariness of confession in this country. This once
bright line has become enshrouded with restrictive interpretations that form part
of the rule and impede its essential purpose.
75. Drizin & Leo, supra note 72, at 919. See id. at 910-11 (stating that "[slocial
scientists and legal scholars have amply documented that contemporary methods of
psychological interrogation can, and sometimes do, lead innocent individuals to confess
falsely to serious felony crimes") (citing GISLI GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 205-58 (2003); Saul Kassin, The Psychology of

Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 221, 224-25 (1997); Richard A. Leo & Richard J.
Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages
of Justice in the Age of PsychologicalInterrogations,88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429,
440-49 (1988); Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely:
Rational Choice and IrrationalAction, 74 DEN. L. REV. 979, 981-1001 (1997) [hereinafter
Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess Falsely]; Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Social
Psychology of Police Interrogations: The Theory and Classification of True and False
Confessions, 16 STUD. L. POL. & SOC'Y 189, 191-94 (1997)). See generally Drizen & Leo,
supra note 72, at 907-23 (2004).
76. Drizin & Leo, supra note 72, at 914. See id. at 918 (characterizing "[miodern
psychological interrogation [as] a gradual yet cumulative process [in which] each
technique builds on the next as the investigator seeks to emphasize the overriding strength
of the State's case and the futility of the suspect's denials" and concluding that "[i]ntended
for the guilty, modern interrogation techniques are psychologically powerful enough to
elicit confessions from the innocent"). See generally id. at 914-19. See also Ofshe & Leo,
Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 74, 76 passim.
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more vulnerable to the pressures of interrogation and are
therefore less likely to possess or to be able to muster the
psychological resources of perspective necessary to withstand
accusatorial police questioning."77 Such discussions of the role of
psychological confusion as a cause of false confessions, including
special attention to individuals of particular psychological
vulnerability, echo-and, thus, may offer a trenchant illustration of
the potentially illuminating application of-the psychological
insights Maimonides and others offered in their analysis of the ban
on confessions in Jewish law.8
V. CONCLUSION

The issue of self-incrimination has confronted AngloAmerican scholars and jurists for centuries,9 resulting in the
adoption of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
as a central tenet of American constitutional law.8" In the words
that conclude a leading historical study of the subject, "[a]bove all,
the Fifth Amendment reflected [the framers'] judgment that in a
free society, based on respect for the individual, the determination
of guilt or innocence by just procedures, in which the accused
made no unwilling contribution to his conviction, was more
important than punishing the guilty.""
If this right is to continue to be taken seriously, the American
legal system should acknowledge and work to protect against the
variety of ways in which a seemingly voluntary confession may in
fact be less than willful, or even the product of coercion, however
subtle. 2 Conceptual consideration of the approach to self-

77. Drizin & Leo, supra note 72, at 919 (citing Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without
Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 495, 499-516 (2002); James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded
Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 445-52 (1985); Paul Hourihan, Earl
Washington's Confession: Mental Retardation and the Law of Confessions, 81 VA. L. REV.
1471, 1491-94 (1995), GUDJONSSON, supra note 74, at 285 (recommending the use of
broad, general questions to avoid suggestibility and acquiescence)).
78. See supra notes 31-53 and accompanying text.
79. See Helmholz, supranote 4, at 279 n.28; LEVY, supra note 4.
80. See LEVY, supranote 4, at 405-32.
81. See id. at 432.
82. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. Cf. Drizin & Leo, supra note 74, at
910 (finding that "[a]s psychological methods of interrogation have evolved over the years,
they have become increasingly sophisticated, relying on more subtle forms of
manipulation, deception, and coercion"); id. at 918 (concluding that "[t]he primary
psychological cause of most false confessions is... the investigator's use of improper,
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incrimination in Jewish law may help facilitate such a reassessment
of American law. As one scholar put it, "[w]hile there is no room
in the contemporary system of proof for the absolute exclusion of
confessions and guilty pleas, an increased sensitivity to their
limitations as proof and the introduction of a requirement that the
judge ascertain what other evidence exists to be weighed with the
would be a warranted
confession before entering the conviction
83
lesson to learn from the Jewish Law.,

coercive interrogation techniques"); Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1043-44
("Inability to choose freely whether to assist the prosecution in securing one's own
conviction--no matter how reliable or ostensibly imperative that assistance may be--is
by any other name coercion."); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect:
SubstantialBenefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. L. REV. 500 (1996):
[W]hatever one may think of Miranda, it is clear-and uncontroversial-that
pressure need not rise to the level of overbearing physical or psychological
coercion, in the due process sense, before it is sufficiently compelling to violate
the Fifth Amendment... [A] formalistic showing of compulsion by legal process
or official punishment cannot be essential .... Indeed, as the Miranda Court
noted ... the "interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to
subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner." As a result, the typical
custodial police interrogation, even if not brutally coercive in the due process
sense, will readily (perhaps almost invariably) violate the Fifth Amendment bar
on the use of compelling pressure, at least in the absence of safeguards sufficient
to dispel that pressure.
Id. at 551-53 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966)).
83. See Enker, supra note 21, at cxxiv.

